Masechet Chullin Daf 24
Dec. 21st, 2018 09:04 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
seekingferretDaf 24
I kind of can't believe I've made it through three weeks. Go me!
The daf continues the discussion of binary categories where one thing is not treated like the other and vice versa.
The Mishna on the last page cited the Eglah Arufa (Decapitated Calf) and the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer), two unusual sacrifices that are offered outside the Beis Hamikdash.
The Eglah Arufa is offered as an apparent atonement for an unsolved murder committed outside city limits between two cities. The elders of the nearest town must get together, decapitate a calf, and offer it while offering a scripted apology. For what, it's unclear, but it's traditionally understood as an apology on behalf of the town for failing to properly escort and defend this visitor to town, and therefore as a lesson that everyone in a town is in some sense collectively responsible for the safety of travelers.
The Parah Adumah is offered as part of a ritual the removes tumas hames. It's the paradigmatic 'chok', a law with no rationale behind it, because there are a number of strange elements to the ritual and in the end, the tahor person offering the sacrifice is paradoxically rendered tamei in the process of making other people tahor.
The Gemara explains that the distinction the Mishna is making is that the Eglah Arufa must be killed by breaking its neck and decapitating it, and it can't be slaughtered by classic shechita, while the Parah Adumah must be killed by shechita and can't be killed by breaking its neck. This is... kind of obvious.
But the Gemara tries to suggest that one could conceivably make a kal vachomer. A kal vachomer is a Talmudic logical tool that means 'from the weak to the strong'. It means that if something is the rule in a case where you would expect it less, then in a related case that has a stronger argument for it, you also learn that this rule applies.
So here the Talmud asks if one could say that since in the case of the Eglah Arufa, the animal is made kosher by breaking its neck even though it could not be rendered kosher by shechita, then in the case of a Parah Adumah where the animal is made kosher by shechita, surely it could also be made kosher by arufa.
It's really hard to understand this question. Kal vachomer is supposed to be made between two related cases where one is the stronger case than the other, but even though this is constructed like a kal vachomer it's not clear which is the stronger case. They're really parallel cases with a particular individualized rule for each. Rabbi Linzer cited a joking analogy to a kal vachomer on eating soup with a fork: If you can eat meat with a fork, and meat is so much heavier and more substantial that you would think it required the superior tool, how much more so could you eat soup with a fork?
The rest of the Gemara's discussion seems to reveal the reason behind the Kal Vachomer. There is a verse from which we midrashically learn that Eglah Arufa must be killed only by decapitation and a verse where we midrashically learn that Parah Adumah must be killed only by shechitah, and... since this is already obvious from the straight reading of the verse, the Gemara is trying to understand why we need to have this midrash. So its answer is, without the midrash based on the verse, we might ask this (extremely strained) kal vachomer. Okay, it's not the most satisfying answer, but it's an answer.
More generally, I think we can say that this continues the general theme of this passage being about how to negotiate binary categorizations that are not really conveniently thought of as binary. First we talked about cases where there was some intermediate case that might really be its own third stage, then we talked about cases where they're more parallel situations than in any way opposite situations. I say fine! Explode all the binaries!
We move on next to the case of the disqualifiers for Kohanim vs. Leviim, which are similarly parallel: A kohen is disqualified for certain physical disabilities, but not based on age. A Levi is disqualified based on age, but not based on any physical disabilities. This is a much better scenario for the Kal Vachomer, but here likewise we have a midrashic tradition that preempts the kal vachomer.
I kind of can't believe I've made it through three weeks. Go me!
The daf continues the discussion of binary categories where one thing is not treated like the other and vice versa.
The Mishna on the last page cited the Eglah Arufa (Decapitated Calf) and the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer), two unusual sacrifices that are offered outside the Beis Hamikdash.
The Eglah Arufa is offered as an apparent atonement for an unsolved murder committed outside city limits between two cities. The elders of the nearest town must get together, decapitate a calf, and offer it while offering a scripted apology. For what, it's unclear, but it's traditionally understood as an apology on behalf of the town for failing to properly escort and defend this visitor to town, and therefore as a lesson that everyone in a town is in some sense collectively responsible for the safety of travelers.
The Parah Adumah is offered as part of a ritual the removes tumas hames. It's the paradigmatic 'chok', a law with no rationale behind it, because there are a number of strange elements to the ritual and in the end, the tahor person offering the sacrifice is paradoxically rendered tamei in the process of making other people tahor.
The Gemara explains that the distinction the Mishna is making is that the Eglah Arufa must be killed by breaking its neck and decapitating it, and it can't be slaughtered by classic shechita, while the Parah Adumah must be killed by shechita and can't be killed by breaking its neck. This is... kind of obvious.
But the Gemara tries to suggest that one could conceivably make a kal vachomer. A kal vachomer is a Talmudic logical tool that means 'from the weak to the strong'. It means that if something is the rule in a case where you would expect it less, then in a related case that has a stronger argument for it, you also learn that this rule applies.
So here the Talmud asks if one could say that since in the case of the Eglah Arufa, the animal is made kosher by breaking its neck even though it could not be rendered kosher by shechita, then in the case of a Parah Adumah where the animal is made kosher by shechita, surely it could also be made kosher by arufa.
It's really hard to understand this question. Kal vachomer is supposed to be made between two related cases where one is the stronger case than the other, but even though this is constructed like a kal vachomer it's not clear which is the stronger case. They're really parallel cases with a particular individualized rule for each. Rabbi Linzer cited a joking analogy to a kal vachomer on eating soup with a fork: If you can eat meat with a fork, and meat is so much heavier and more substantial that you would think it required the superior tool, how much more so could you eat soup with a fork?
The rest of the Gemara's discussion seems to reveal the reason behind the Kal Vachomer. There is a verse from which we midrashically learn that Eglah Arufa must be killed only by decapitation and a verse where we midrashically learn that Parah Adumah must be killed only by shechitah, and... since this is already obvious from the straight reading of the verse, the Gemara is trying to understand why we need to have this midrash. So its answer is, without the midrash based on the verse, we might ask this (extremely strained) kal vachomer. Okay, it's not the most satisfying answer, but it's an answer.
More generally, I think we can say that this continues the general theme of this passage being about how to negotiate binary categorizations that are not really conveniently thought of as binary. First we talked about cases where there was some intermediate case that might really be its own third stage, then we talked about cases where they're more parallel situations than in any way opposite situations. I say fine! Explode all the binaries!
We move on next to the case of the disqualifiers for Kohanim vs. Leviim, which are similarly parallel: A kohen is disqualified for certain physical disabilities, but not based on age. A Levi is disqualified based on age, but not based on any physical disabilities. This is a much better scenario for the Kal Vachomer, but here likewise we have a midrashic tradition that preempts the kal vachomer.
(no subject)
Date: 2018-12-24 07:45 am (UTC)