Masechet Ketubah Daf 14-17
Jul. 25th, 2022 11:10 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
Worn out from the big trip to Boston yesterday, let's make this catchup post short...ish?
Daf 14
On Daf 13 I talked about Rabban Gamliel's statement that you believe the woman. The Gemara seems reluctant to take this as some universal rule, they try to find the one specific case that he is talking about. This is a rhetorical device the Gemara uses often, and I think sometimes the idea isn't to refute the idea that it's a universal doctrine (with exceptions) but just to teach a bunch of related halachos through a unifying structural mechanism. Ultimately they do wind up more or less as I stated on Daf 13- it's a universal principle in cases where it's just a she-said/he-said coin toss, but if there's any witnesses or other compelling reason to favor one side over another, that of course overrules, and so the Gemara goes through a variety of cases that overrule.
Daf 15
Through discussion of rape and other things I don't want to dwell on too much, the Gemara actually subtly gets to the core of why so many of these questions about validity of marriages matter. The status of children is one of the key functions of marriage in Jewish law, as a societal concern as opposed to an interpersonal contract between two people. Is a child a mamzer or not? Is a woman able to marry a Kohen and have children who are pure to enter the priesthood? These are really important questions in the society of the Talmud, and there was no genetic testing so paternity depended on faithful monogamy or at least polygyny, which explains why these upsetting topics keep getting addressed.
Daf 16
New perek! If a woman gets divorced and tries to claim her marriage payment, and the ketubah is nowhere to be found, and there is a dispute about whether she is entitled to the payment for a betulah or an almanah, what kind of witness can you find? The husband and wife are the only witnesses to actual biah, but the Mishnah says you can get witnesses who were at the nisuin who will testify about whether or not she was treated like a betulah at the wedding. Which according to the traditions of the time meant she would be wearing some sort of specific head covering that marked her as a betulah, but the Gemara is clear that this is contextual and whatever the custom of marking a betulah in your society is valid. So possibly if she wore white at a modern wedding? Needless to say, better to not lose your ketubah.
Daf 17
There's an idea that testimony against personal interest is accepted, because if someone's testimony is strictly against their benefit, why would they testify if they're not telling the truth? But what if they make a testimony that is partially against their interest but partially in their interest. In particular, what if they concede something that nobody would have known was true otherwise and which harms their case, but ultimately their testimony works out well for them? The general law is that you can accept it, provided there are no witnesses and no other reason to suspect them.
As an example, I testify that this land used to belong to a man, and then I bought it from him, and then the man died while his son was underage, and now the son is an adult. The logic is that I could have just testified that I always owned the land (since the minor son wouldn't remember what his father owned for sure), I didn't need to concede that the land used to belong to the other man, so even though ultimately my testimony is in my favor, it's still sort of adverse to my interest and accepted as truthful. But if witnesses came forward and said "This land used to belong to the man." and I say "Yes, this used to belong to the man, but I bought it from him before he died." then my testimony against interest is just acknowledging what others already know, so there's no reason to believe me.
Why is this in this perek, it has nothing to do with ketubot? In a few dapim the Mishna will cover some cases that relate to ketubot, and the Mishna is just lumping the whole concept together.
Daf 14
On Daf 13 I talked about Rabban Gamliel's statement that you believe the woman. The Gemara seems reluctant to take this as some universal rule, they try to find the one specific case that he is talking about. This is a rhetorical device the Gemara uses often, and I think sometimes the idea isn't to refute the idea that it's a universal doctrine (with exceptions) but just to teach a bunch of related halachos through a unifying structural mechanism. Ultimately they do wind up more or less as I stated on Daf 13- it's a universal principle in cases where it's just a she-said/he-said coin toss, but if there's any witnesses or other compelling reason to favor one side over another, that of course overrules, and so the Gemara goes through a variety of cases that overrule.
Daf 15
Through discussion of rape and other things I don't want to dwell on too much, the Gemara actually subtly gets to the core of why so many of these questions about validity of marriages matter. The status of children is one of the key functions of marriage in Jewish law, as a societal concern as opposed to an interpersonal contract between two people. Is a child a mamzer or not? Is a woman able to marry a Kohen and have children who are pure to enter the priesthood? These are really important questions in the society of the Talmud, and there was no genetic testing so paternity depended on faithful monogamy or at least polygyny, which explains why these upsetting topics keep getting addressed.
Daf 16
New perek! If a woman gets divorced and tries to claim her marriage payment, and the ketubah is nowhere to be found, and there is a dispute about whether she is entitled to the payment for a betulah or an almanah, what kind of witness can you find? The husband and wife are the only witnesses to actual biah, but the Mishnah says you can get witnesses who were at the nisuin who will testify about whether or not she was treated like a betulah at the wedding. Which according to the traditions of the time meant she would be wearing some sort of specific head covering that marked her as a betulah, but the Gemara is clear that this is contextual and whatever the custom of marking a betulah in your society is valid. So possibly if she wore white at a modern wedding? Needless to say, better to not lose your ketubah.
Daf 17
There's an idea that testimony against personal interest is accepted, because if someone's testimony is strictly against their benefit, why would they testify if they're not telling the truth? But what if they make a testimony that is partially against their interest but partially in their interest. In particular, what if they concede something that nobody would have known was true otherwise and which harms their case, but ultimately their testimony works out well for them? The general law is that you can accept it, provided there are no witnesses and no other reason to suspect them.
As an example, I testify that this land used to belong to a man, and then I bought it from him, and then the man died while his son was underage, and now the son is an adult. The logic is that I could have just testified that I always owned the land (since the minor son wouldn't remember what his father owned for sure), I didn't need to concede that the land used to belong to the other man, so even though ultimately my testimony is in my favor, it's still sort of adverse to my interest and accepted as truthful. But if witnesses came forward and said "This land used to belong to the man." and I say "Yes, this used to belong to the man, but I bought it from him before he died." then my testimony against interest is just acknowledging what others already know, so there's no reason to believe me.
Why is this in this perek, it has nothing to do with ketubot? In a few dapim the Mishna will cover some cases that relate to ketubot, and the Mishna is just lumping the whole concept together.