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seekingferretIt was a really lovely Shavuos all around, though 3 Day Chagim are always a little bit overkill. The Shabbos beforehand was a friend's aufruf- we had a nice, whiskey-filled celebratory lunch after davening, and then I did a little learning of Pirkei Avos and got a long Shabbos nap.
I started Tikkun Leil Shavuos at my local shul, then after a few hours walked over to someone's house that hosts a bunch of people for learning and massive amounts of sugar. Davening started at 5AM and was over by 6:45, and then I finally slept.
Incoherent and Incomplete Notes on Tikkun Leil Shavuos, because I was sleepy and couldn't actually take notes during the shiurim
-The First shiur I heard was on the Rambam's justification for learning from non-Jewish philosophers. The Rabbi tried to ask if Rambam's justification was connected to R' Meir's relationship with R' Elisha ben Abuya, or Acher, the heretical Tanna that R' Meir apparently continued to learn from because he knew halakhos nobody else did. The Gemara in Chagiga discusses this problem and presents two opinions- one is that nobody may learn Torah from an apikores (and therefore R' Meir was wrong to do so) and the other is that a great person can do so because they are compared to a nut that has a hard shell of Torah to protect them from corruption, but a lesser person may not because they are more vulnerable to being led off the proper path. Looking at Mishneh Torah in the halakhos for learning Torah, Rambam only teaches the former position as the psak. The Rambam holds that it is impermissible to learn Torah from an apikores even if one is a Gadol. Nonetheless Moreh Nevuchin and even his commentaries on the Mishna are full of citations to non-Jewish scholars! The conclusion is that the Rambam considers it forbidden to learn Torah from corrupt sources, but thinks it permissible to learn chokhma from anyone, Jew or non-Jew, because chokhma is valuable whoever it comes from.
This is a little difficult because in general the Rambam's definition of Torah seems pretty broad, how do you distinguish permissible chokhma from impermissible Torah? Also, the Rambam uses the verse cited to say that R' Meir learning from Acher was okay as an epigram on Moreh Nevuchin, perhaps hinting that he did have sympathy for R' Meir's position.
In any case, the lecture than shifted from halakhic to hashkafic subjects. He made two hashkafic arguments. First, that this idea that one must learn Torah from a proper and uncorrupted source is an important idea that stems from a conception of Matan Torah as being a literally world-changing event that altered every Jewish soul in a way that makes us particularly receptive to receiving Torah. The sources we learn Torah from matter because learning Torah from the wrong place is in some metaphysical sense a denial of the change to our soul at Matan Torah. I am explaining this badly.
Second, that R' Meir was exceptional, perhaps, because of a lesson he learned from his wife Beruriah as noted in a famous story in the Gemara in Berakhos. R' Meir had enemies, and he prayed for them to die, until his wife rebuked him and told him he should instead pray for them to repent, which they did. He suggested that from this story, R' Meir learned that even the blackest sinners had space in their souls for repentance, and that's why he thought there was uncorrupted Torah in Acher to be learned. I thought this was a really nice idea to end the shiur on.
The next shiur was on the laws of B'Nei Noach and whether Jews have some sort of affirmative obligation to spread them, as the Lubavitcher Rebbe believed.
The conclusion was, probably not. The passages the Lubavitcher interpretation leans on seem much more likely to be speaking to our administration of law to non-Jews living under Jewish political sovereignty, not to a general obligation as part of being Or Lagoyim. But it was interesting nonetheless to consider our position relative to non-Jews in these terms. The Noahide laws are written about in Jewish literature in very strange ways. They're largely dealt with in the language of Jewish halakhists, but they're discussing obligations on people who don't hold by the principles of Jewish halakha, which is absurd. I discussed some of this broadly during my Daf Yomi posts, the scenario in which the law of Ever Min Hachai is stricter for non-Jews than Jews because non-Jews don't have a concept of shechita. This is a totally counterintuitive way to think about Noahide laws. (in fact, the Rambam's discussion of the Noahide laws says that non-Jews who observe them get a chelek in Olam Haba only if they have not come to them for ethical reasons.)
To justify this, the Rabbi went off on a detour about the nature of the obligation of the Noahide laws on Jews. There's two possible ways to understand Har Sinai: Either Hashem added 606 laws to the pre-existing 7 laws of B'nei Noach, or Hashem gave 613 all new commandments at Sinai which included new versions of the laws of B'nei Noach, so that Jews are not obligated in the original version of the 7. This latter version is the more aesthetically pleasing and theologically consistent, and gives an interesting frame to consider the Jew's relationship to non-Jews.
The next shiur was on the halakhic issues involved with CRISPR, which are largely the halakhic issues involved in in vitro fertilization, about whether one is permitted to discard fertilized embryos, and so on. (Probably, yes.) He then shifted to discussing the hashkafic questions involving CRISPR, whether Jews are allowed to 'play God'. There is a counter-position, as expressed in the Sefer haChinuch on the mitzvot of kilayim, that the problem with these cross-breeds is that they usurp God's position about the proper number and type of species in the world. But largely Jewish thought is aligned with the idea that we can play God, that we were created B'tzelem Elokim and it's our mission to do tikkun olam and perfect this world. So yay therapeutic applications of CRISPR, less yay possibly to other applications?
The next shiur was on the origins of marginal minhagim that everyone takes for granted.
One example was saying "L'chaim" before drinking alcohol, specifically immediately before saying kiddush. He traced that to the ancient method of execution. They'd bring the accused out in front of the beis din and hear the evidence and question the witnesses, and if innocent they'd say "L'chaim, L'chaim," and if guilty, "L'Misa, L'Misa", and if condemned they'd then give them strong alcohol to sedate them before the execution. So therefore in circumstances when we are consuming alcohol but not as part of an execution, the tradition developed to say "L'chaim" to indicate that we are not about to be executed.
And the mig'dal mag'dil difference between Birkat Hamazon during the week and on Shabbos. There's a folk legend that this came from a misprint. The pasuk with mig'dal or mag'dil appears in Shmuel II and in Tehillim, with the only difference in the k'tiv of the two psukim being mig'dal or mag'dil. So some theorized that a printer had written Mig'dal (בש״ב) meaning "In Shmuel Bet" and people had misunderstood it as an abbreviation for "On Shabbat". Which is a delightful folk legend! But this can't be the explanation because there are sources for the minhag that predate the printing press and the separation of Shmuel into Alef and Bet. So apparently we don't know the real reason.
I also learned a litle bit of Masechet Shabbos, posts on that to begin soon.
I started Tikkun Leil Shavuos at my local shul, then after a few hours walked over to someone's house that hosts a bunch of people for learning and massive amounts of sugar. Davening started at 5AM and was over by 6:45, and then I finally slept.
Incoherent and Incomplete Notes on Tikkun Leil Shavuos, because I was sleepy and couldn't actually take notes during the shiurim
-The First shiur I heard was on the Rambam's justification for learning from non-Jewish philosophers. The Rabbi tried to ask if Rambam's justification was connected to R' Meir's relationship with R' Elisha ben Abuya, or Acher, the heretical Tanna that R' Meir apparently continued to learn from because he knew halakhos nobody else did. The Gemara in Chagiga discusses this problem and presents two opinions- one is that nobody may learn Torah from an apikores (and therefore R' Meir was wrong to do so) and the other is that a great person can do so because they are compared to a nut that has a hard shell of Torah to protect them from corruption, but a lesser person may not because they are more vulnerable to being led off the proper path. Looking at Mishneh Torah in the halakhos for learning Torah, Rambam only teaches the former position as the psak. The Rambam holds that it is impermissible to learn Torah from an apikores even if one is a Gadol. Nonetheless Moreh Nevuchin and even his commentaries on the Mishna are full of citations to non-Jewish scholars! The conclusion is that the Rambam considers it forbidden to learn Torah from corrupt sources, but thinks it permissible to learn chokhma from anyone, Jew or non-Jew, because chokhma is valuable whoever it comes from.
This is a little difficult because in general the Rambam's definition of Torah seems pretty broad, how do you distinguish permissible chokhma from impermissible Torah? Also, the Rambam uses the verse cited to say that R' Meir learning from Acher was okay as an epigram on Moreh Nevuchin, perhaps hinting that he did have sympathy for R' Meir's position.
In any case, the lecture than shifted from halakhic to hashkafic subjects. He made two hashkafic arguments. First, that this idea that one must learn Torah from a proper and uncorrupted source is an important idea that stems from a conception of Matan Torah as being a literally world-changing event that altered every Jewish soul in a way that makes us particularly receptive to receiving Torah. The sources we learn Torah from matter because learning Torah from the wrong place is in some metaphysical sense a denial of the change to our soul at Matan Torah. I am explaining this badly.
Second, that R' Meir was exceptional, perhaps, because of a lesson he learned from his wife Beruriah as noted in a famous story in the Gemara in Berakhos. R' Meir had enemies, and he prayed for them to die, until his wife rebuked him and told him he should instead pray for them to repent, which they did. He suggested that from this story, R' Meir learned that even the blackest sinners had space in their souls for repentance, and that's why he thought there was uncorrupted Torah in Acher to be learned. I thought this was a really nice idea to end the shiur on.
The next shiur was on the laws of B'Nei Noach and whether Jews have some sort of affirmative obligation to spread them, as the Lubavitcher Rebbe believed.
The conclusion was, probably not. The passages the Lubavitcher interpretation leans on seem much more likely to be speaking to our administration of law to non-Jews living under Jewish political sovereignty, not to a general obligation as part of being Or Lagoyim. But it was interesting nonetheless to consider our position relative to non-Jews in these terms. The Noahide laws are written about in Jewish literature in very strange ways. They're largely dealt with in the language of Jewish halakhists, but they're discussing obligations on people who don't hold by the principles of Jewish halakha, which is absurd. I discussed some of this broadly during my Daf Yomi posts, the scenario in which the law of Ever Min Hachai is stricter for non-Jews than Jews because non-Jews don't have a concept of shechita. This is a totally counterintuitive way to think about Noahide laws. (in fact, the Rambam's discussion of the Noahide laws says that non-Jews who observe them get a chelek in Olam Haba only if they have not come to them for ethical reasons.)
To justify this, the Rabbi went off on a detour about the nature of the obligation of the Noahide laws on Jews. There's two possible ways to understand Har Sinai: Either Hashem added 606 laws to the pre-existing 7 laws of B'nei Noach, or Hashem gave 613 all new commandments at Sinai which included new versions of the laws of B'nei Noach, so that Jews are not obligated in the original version of the 7. This latter version is the more aesthetically pleasing and theologically consistent, and gives an interesting frame to consider the Jew's relationship to non-Jews.
The next shiur was on the halakhic issues involved with CRISPR, which are largely the halakhic issues involved in in vitro fertilization, about whether one is permitted to discard fertilized embryos, and so on. (Probably, yes.) He then shifted to discussing the hashkafic questions involving CRISPR, whether Jews are allowed to 'play God'. There is a counter-position, as expressed in the Sefer haChinuch on the mitzvot of kilayim, that the problem with these cross-breeds is that they usurp God's position about the proper number and type of species in the world. But largely Jewish thought is aligned with the idea that we can play God, that we were created B'tzelem Elokim and it's our mission to do tikkun olam and perfect this world. So yay therapeutic applications of CRISPR, less yay possibly to other applications?
The next shiur was on the origins of marginal minhagim that everyone takes for granted.
One example was saying "L'chaim" before drinking alcohol, specifically immediately before saying kiddush. He traced that to the ancient method of execution. They'd bring the accused out in front of the beis din and hear the evidence and question the witnesses, and if innocent they'd say "L'chaim, L'chaim," and if guilty, "L'Misa, L'Misa", and if condemned they'd then give them strong alcohol to sedate them before the execution. So therefore in circumstances when we are consuming alcohol but not as part of an execution, the tradition developed to say "L'chaim" to indicate that we are not about to be executed.
And the mig'dal mag'dil difference between Birkat Hamazon during the week and on Shabbos. There's a folk legend that this came from a misprint. The pasuk with mig'dal or mag'dil appears in Shmuel II and in Tehillim, with the only difference in the k'tiv of the two psukim being mig'dal or mag'dil. So some theorized that a printer had written Mig'dal (בש״ב) meaning "In Shmuel Bet" and people had misunderstood it as an abbreviation for "On Shabbat". Which is a delightful folk legend! But this can't be the explanation because there are sources for the minhag that predate the printing press and the separation of Shmuel into Alef and Bet. So apparently we don't know the real reason.
I also learned a litle bit of Masechet Shabbos, posts on that to begin soon.
(no subject)
Date: 2019-06-11 05:18 am (UTC)Davening started at 5AM and was over by 6:45
I am extremely impressed by your efficiency.
(no subject)
Date: 2019-06-11 01:41 pm (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2019-06-12 04:35 am (UTC)