Masechet Chullin Daf 41
Jan. 8th, 2019 08:42 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
seekingferretDaf 41
The Daf begins with questions on Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzchak's principle that one cannot make something issur that belongs to someone else.
Plainly in a straight sense this cannot be true. If someone dips someone else's hamburger in cheese, it's issur. But that's not really that they made it issur in a metaphysical sense. They caused an actual physical change in the material that rendered it issur, so the change they caused is no different than if the hamburger fell off the table into a vat of cheese. So we're saying really that someone cannot impose a prohibited metaphysical status that involves intentionality on something that belongs to someone else.
There are some questionable cases- if you touch someone else's wine while you are tamei, you render it tamei. The Rabbis who agree with Rav Huna have no problem with this case, but the Rabbis who agree with Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzchak say that this case only applies if the wine is owned in partnership between the tamei person and the other party, but if you have no ownership, you cannot transmit tumah.
The next Mishnah is about kinds of shechita that are forbidden seemingly not because they are avodah zarah, because avodah zarah requires intent and the shochet in these cases has no intention other than to shecht the meat, but because they look like avodah zarah. For example you are forbidden to shecht an animal and drain its blood directly into the sea, even though that might be a conveniently clean way of shechitah, because it has the appearance of offering the blood to the sea gods.
Rabbi Linzer raises the question of whether the issue is mar'is ayin or something about personal propriety. Is the problem with this shechita that others might think you are offering a sacrifice to the sea gods, or is the problem that even though you don't have intention to do avodah zarah, you want to distance yourself from acts that even work like avodah zarah to keep yourself close to kedusha? I mean, maybe that's the real issue with mar'is ayin anyway, but that's a deeper conversation we can have.
In any case, the workaround if you absolutely must is to drain the blood in an indirect way. In the sea example, to shecht the animal over the side of the boat so the blood runs down the side of the boat before going into the sea.
Rabbi Linzer had a whole rant about this principle and its modern applications in the conflict over Open Orthodoxy that I'm going to transcribe and post when I get a chance because it was really interesting.
And the last mishna of the perek is about fake shechita l'chutz. If one consecrates an animal, then it must be shechted inside the Temple environs. If shechted outside the Temple, it's forbidden. But what if one doesn't consecrate an animal, and then shechts it outside the Temple while saying that it's for the sake of a sacrifice?
As we've established, shechita chullin doesn't require kavana (except when it does), so d'oraysa there's no problem. The animals weren't consecrated, saying it's for the sake of a kosher sacrifice isn't idolatrous or anything. It's a weird thing to do, but it's not an issur. But for mar'is ayin reasons the Rabbis prohibited the meat from such a sacrifice IF it was the type of sacrifice where one can voluntarily consecrate the animal. Because in such a case, onlookers might think that you had actually consecrated the animal and were doing shechita l'chutz, but in other cases it would be obvious that you hadn't.
I think for practical purposes, therefore, this Mishnah isn't really teaching about the laws of shechita, it's teaching about the circumstances where one can voluntarily consecrate an animal.
The Daf begins with questions on Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzchak's principle that one cannot make something issur that belongs to someone else.
Plainly in a straight sense this cannot be true. If someone dips someone else's hamburger in cheese, it's issur. But that's not really that they made it issur in a metaphysical sense. They caused an actual physical change in the material that rendered it issur, so the change they caused is no different than if the hamburger fell off the table into a vat of cheese. So we're saying really that someone cannot impose a prohibited metaphysical status that involves intentionality on something that belongs to someone else.
There are some questionable cases- if you touch someone else's wine while you are tamei, you render it tamei. The Rabbis who agree with Rav Huna have no problem with this case, but the Rabbis who agree with Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzchak say that this case only applies if the wine is owned in partnership between the tamei person and the other party, but if you have no ownership, you cannot transmit tumah.
The next Mishnah is about kinds of shechita that are forbidden seemingly not because they are avodah zarah, because avodah zarah requires intent and the shochet in these cases has no intention other than to shecht the meat, but because they look like avodah zarah. For example you are forbidden to shecht an animal and drain its blood directly into the sea, even though that might be a conveniently clean way of shechitah, because it has the appearance of offering the blood to the sea gods.
Rabbi Linzer raises the question of whether the issue is mar'is ayin or something about personal propriety. Is the problem with this shechita that others might think you are offering a sacrifice to the sea gods, or is the problem that even though you don't have intention to do avodah zarah, you want to distance yourself from acts that even work like avodah zarah to keep yourself close to kedusha? I mean, maybe that's the real issue with mar'is ayin anyway, but that's a deeper conversation we can have.
In any case, the workaround if you absolutely must is to drain the blood in an indirect way. In the sea example, to shecht the animal over the side of the boat so the blood runs down the side of the boat before going into the sea.
Rabbi Linzer had a whole rant about this principle and its modern applications in the conflict over Open Orthodoxy that I'm going to transcribe and post when I get a chance because it was really interesting.
And the last mishna of the perek is about fake shechita l'chutz. If one consecrates an animal, then it must be shechted inside the Temple environs. If shechted outside the Temple, it's forbidden. But what if one doesn't consecrate an animal, and then shechts it outside the Temple while saying that it's for the sake of a sacrifice?
As we've established, shechita chullin doesn't require kavana (except when it does), so d'oraysa there's no problem. The animals weren't consecrated, saying it's for the sake of a kosher sacrifice isn't idolatrous or anything. It's a weird thing to do, but it's not an issur. But for mar'is ayin reasons the Rabbis prohibited the meat from such a sacrifice IF it was the type of sacrifice where one can voluntarily consecrate the animal. Because in such a case, onlookers might think that you had actually consecrated the animal and were doing shechita l'chutz, but in other cases it would be obvious that you hadn't.
I think for practical purposes, therefore, this Mishnah isn't really teaching about the laws of shechita, it's teaching about the circumstances where one can voluntarily consecrate an animal.