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Masechet Keritot Daf 11-14
Sep. 27th, 2019 03:39 pmDaf 11
So, remember, the masechet is about keritot, sins that incur the mystical punishment of karet if done intentionally. If done unintentionally, they incur an obligation to offer a chatat, a sin offering, as an atonement. This perek goes into more of the details of some of the specific keritot and how they interact with each other when a chatat is incurred.
It starts with some of the mechanics of the chatat. This is an individual offering made as an atonement for an accidental sin that generally doesn't directly harm others. So the question is, is there a court mechanism for imposing this obligation on someone, and does it work like other financial obligations enforced in court? Remember, the Temple era was a theocracy where the government required people to observe Jewish law and could take police action against those who didn't.
But this doesn't really seem to be the textual sense behind the obligation of chatat, which talk about a person taking responsibility for their actions, so the Rabbis sort of resist imposing a legalistic court obligation on the process.
If a witness testifies that I committed a kerita b'shogeg, and I say nothing, then I owe a chatat offering. If a witness testifies that I committed a kerita b'shogeg and I say "No, I didn't," then I don't owe a chatat offering. The presumption is that I know what I did better than they did, and we're not imposing a full legalistic process on this question since it's purely about a personal obligation I have to Hashem.
But if two witnesses testify that I committed a kerita b'shogeg, some want to say that some parts of the legal process kick in. Two valid witnesses is what is generally required to establish the facts to convict someone in Jewish court, so if two witnesses testify, in some real sense facts have been established. So Rabbi Meir wants to say that in that case, even if I say I didn't do it, I'm still chayiv chatat. But the Rabbis say no, even in that case the ultimate factor is what I say about what I did.
Daf 12
We get here an interesting case that is more attenuated. Eating food in the Temple while tamei is forbidden and would incur chatat. What if witnesses testify that I was tamei, and that I then later ate food in the Temple, and I say "No, I didn't."? Perhaps there's no disagreement that I ate kodshin, but there's disagreement about whether I was tamei.
Like, imagine the scenario
1. Witnesses see me become tamei.
2. Time passes.
3. Witnesses see me eat kodshin.
There's two possibilities for event 2. Either I immersed myself in the mikvah and was purified, or I didn't. But if witnesses testify to 1 and 3, those things are formally in the record and so the testimony is that I was impure when I ate kodshin. But the question of whether I was or wasn't tamei is not the central question of whether I ate kodshin when tamei, it's just a prerequisite fact, so perhaps me just saying that I didn't is not enough in this case. If I could bring two witnesses who saw me immerse in the mikveh, of course that changes things, but the idea is that the special witness rules that my testimony about myself is believed over witnesses on matters of chatat might not work in this case.
Daf 13
They're talking about the minimum quantities consumed required to violate different laws. With the prohibition on drinking wine before entering the Beis Hamikdash, which stems from the story of Nadab and Abihu, there's a machloket about whether the minimum is a revi'is or if any amount of wine disqualifies. Answer: Probably both are forbidden, but the minimal is chayav malkus and the maximal is chayav misa.
Rabbi Ashi wanted a p'sak from Rav annulling a foolish oath he made, so he went to see Rav. Rav said "Sorry, come back tomorrow, I'm out of the p'sak business today because I drank wine." This ties in to the previous question, because Rav is not drunk- he simply has had wine to drink and he doesn't issue p'sak if he's had wine. They bicker about this for a few minutes, Rabbi Linzer points out the irony that Rav says he can't issue a halachic ruling and they then argue about the halacha of whether he is allowed to issue a halachic ruling.
I like this on two levels. I like the idea that making halachic decisions is such a serious matter that if one has even the suspicion that one might be impaired, one should abstain. But I particularly like it because of the way it's part of the structure of linkages the Rabbis created between their tradition of Pharisaism and the Temple service. Rav is clearly saying that he sees the exegesis of the Talmud as being parallel to the avodah in the Beis Hamikdash, and therefore he is bound by the strictures as if he were a Kohen in the Temple.
Daf 14
Normally there's a principle in Jewish law that identical punishments don't stack for the same act. A classic example of this, as I discussed while learning Chullin, is bacon and cheese. This is not prohibited. That is to say, pig is forbidden to be eaten, and eating meat and milk is forbidden, but eating bacon and cheese is not considered to violate the prohibition of meat and milk, because the bacon is already forbidden as a simple lo ta'aseh that incurs lashes as a punishment. On the other hand, a bacon cheeseburger violates both prohibitions- the bacon violates the prohibition on pig, the cheese + beef burger violates the prohibition on milk and meat.
The exception to the rule is prohibitions that in some way Expand the Scope of the prohibition. For example, if one law prohibits eating something to everyone but kohanim, and another law prohibits eating something to everyone, those can stack, because the second law expands the scope. There are several different kinds of scope expansion this applies to, but the overall concept is complicated and has weird contours. To explore those weird contours.. and mostly just to have a bit of fun... the Rabbis try to figure out the way to incur the most chatat obligations in one act.
First, they do it with food. How can you eat one thing and incur the most chatat obligations? You eat chelev that was consecrated and placed on the altar and then removed, on Yom Kippur, while you are tamei. This incurs the prohibition of eating chelev, the prohibition of eating consecrated food while tamei, the prohibition of eating notar, the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur, and the prohibition of eating consecrated food in a nonconsecrated circumstance. There is a complicated way to expound these prohibitions so each expands the scope of the previous, I'm not going to go through all the details.
Then they do it with sex. This involves the most amazingly convoluted process worthy of a soap opera... You know the song "I'm My Own Grandpa"? This is worse than that. I had a daughter with my mother, so she is also my sister. She then marries my half-brother (same father, different mother), then divorces him, then marries my uncle (father's brother), then divorces him, then marries someone else. Then she is a niddah. I sleep with her. I have violated prohibition on sleeping with a married woman, a niddah, my sister, my daughter, my brother's wife, and my father's brother's wife, in one act of sex.
So, remember, the masechet is about keritot, sins that incur the mystical punishment of karet if done intentionally. If done unintentionally, they incur an obligation to offer a chatat, a sin offering, as an atonement. This perek goes into more of the details of some of the specific keritot and how they interact with each other when a chatat is incurred.
It starts with some of the mechanics of the chatat. This is an individual offering made as an atonement for an accidental sin that generally doesn't directly harm others. So the question is, is there a court mechanism for imposing this obligation on someone, and does it work like other financial obligations enforced in court? Remember, the Temple era was a theocracy where the government required people to observe Jewish law and could take police action against those who didn't.
But this doesn't really seem to be the textual sense behind the obligation of chatat, which talk about a person taking responsibility for their actions, so the Rabbis sort of resist imposing a legalistic court obligation on the process.
If a witness testifies that I committed a kerita b'shogeg, and I say nothing, then I owe a chatat offering. If a witness testifies that I committed a kerita b'shogeg and I say "No, I didn't," then I don't owe a chatat offering. The presumption is that I know what I did better than they did, and we're not imposing a full legalistic process on this question since it's purely about a personal obligation I have to Hashem.
But if two witnesses testify that I committed a kerita b'shogeg, some want to say that some parts of the legal process kick in. Two valid witnesses is what is generally required to establish the facts to convict someone in Jewish court, so if two witnesses testify, in some real sense facts have been established. So Rabbi Meir wants to say that in that case, even if I say I didn't do it, I'm still chayiv chatat. But the Rabbis say no, even in that case the ultimate factor is what I say about what I did.
Daf 12
We get here an interesting case that is more attenuated. Eating food in the Temple while tamei is forbidden and would incur chatat. What if witnesses testify that I was tamei, and that I then later ate food in the Temple, and I say "No, I didn't."? Perhaps there's no disagreement that I ate kodshin, but there's disagreement about whether I was tamei.
Like, imagine the scenario
1. Witnesses see me become tamei.
2. Time passes.
3. Witnesses see me eat kodshin.
There's two possibilities for event 2. Either I immersed myself in the mikvah and was purified, or I didn't. But if witnesses testify to 1 and 3, those things are formally in the record and so the testimony is that I was impure when I ate kodshin. But the question of whether I was or wasn't tamei is not the central question of whether I ate kodshin when tamei, it's just a prerequisite fact, so perhaps me just saying that I didn't is not enough in this case. If I could bring two witnesses who saw me immerse in the mikveh, of course that changes things, but the idea is that the special witness rules that my testimony about myself is believed over witnesses on matters of chatat might not work in this case.
Daf 13
They're talking about the minimum quantities consumed required to violate different laws. With the prohibition on drinking wine before entering the Beis Hamikdash, which stems from the story of Nadab and Abihu, there's a machloket about whether the minimum is a revi'is or if any amount of wine disqualifies. Answer: Probably both are forbidden, but the minimal is chayav malkus and the maximal is chayav misa.
Rabbi Ashi wanted a p'sak from Rav annulling a foolish oath he made, so he went to see Rav. Rav said "Sorry, come back tomorrow, I'm out of the p'sak business today because I drank wine." This ties in to the previous question, because Rav is not drunk- he simply has had wine to drink and he doesn't issue p'sak if he's had wine. They bicker about this for a few minutes, Rabbi Linzer points out the irony that Rav says he can't issue a halachic ruling and they then argue about the halacha of whether he is allowed to issue a halachic ruling.
I like this on two levels. I like the idea that making halachic decisions is such a serious matter that if one has even the suspicion that one might be impaired, one should abstain. But I particularly like it because of the way it's part of the structure of linkages the Rabbis created between their tradition of Pharisaism and the Temple service. Rav is clearly saying that he sees the exegesis of the Talmud as being parallel to the avodah in the Beis Hamikdash, and therefore he is bound by the strictures as if he were a Kohen in the Temple.
Daf 14
Normally there's a principle in Jewish law that identical punishments don't stack for the same act. A classic example of this, as I discussed while learning Chullin, is bacon and cheese. This is not prohibited. That is to say, pig is forbidden to be eaten, and eating meat and milk is forbidden, but eating bacon and cheese is not considered to violate the prohibition of meat and milk, because the bacon is already forbidden as a simple lo ta'aseh that incurs lashes as a punishment. On the other hand, a bacon cheeseburger violates both prohibitions- the bacon violates the prohibition on pig, the cheese + beef burger violates the prohibition on milk and meat.
The exception to the rule is prohibitions that in some way Expand the Scope of the prohibition. For example, if one law prohibits eating something to everyone but kohanim, and another law prohibits eating something to everyone, those can stack, because the second law expands the scope. There are several different kinds of scope expansion this applies to, but the overall concept is complicated and has weird contours. To explore those weird contours.. and mostly just to have a bit of fun... the Rabbis try to figure out the way to incur the most chatat obligations in one act.
First, they do it with food. How can you eat one thing and incur the most chatat obligations? You eat chelev that was consecrated and placed on the altar and then removed, on Yom Kippur, while you are tamei. This incurs the prohibition of eating chelev, the prohibition of eating consecrated food while tamei, the prohibition of eating notar, the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur, and the prohibition of eating consecrated food in a nonconsecrated circumstance. There is a complicated way to expound these prohibitions so each expands the scope of the previous, I'm not going to go through all the details.
Then they do it with sex. This involves the most amazingly convoluted process worthy of a soap opera... You know the song "I'm My Own Grandpa"? This is worse than that. I had a daughter with my mother, so she is also my sister. She then marries my half-brother (same father, different mother), then divorces him, then marries my uncle (father's brother), then divorces him, then marries someone else. Then she is a niddah. I sleep with her. I have violated prohibition on sleeping with a married woman, a niddah, my sister, my daughter, my brother's wife, and my father's brother's wife, in one act of sex.