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Masechet Keritot Daf 3
Aug. 28th, 2019 10:05 amDaf 3
Aha, we of course get to the problem with a list with a clear enumeration... If there's a number, you can always argue on the number. Cleaner to not have an enumeration. :P
The Mishna said there were 36 aveiros that incurred karet if done intentionally and chatat offering if done b'shogeg. But two of those were mitzot aseh, Pesach and Brit Milah, so there's 34 lo ta'aseh mitzvot. Except not entirely? Because there's no one person who's subject to all 34 mitzot lo ta'aseh.
A lot of the mitzvot that incur karet are arayot, the laws of impermissible sexual relations. Which makes this whole topic incredibly dicey to talk about, but here goes. Two of the arayot, the prohibition on homosexuality and the prohibition on sex with animals, are only imposed on men. And one of the arayot, a different prohibition on sex with animals, is only imposed on women. So men only incur karet from 33 mitzvot lo ta'aseh, and women can only incur karet from 32. But we have an enumerated list of 36 less two, how can this be?
The easiest answer is Well, duh, it's just a list of all the possibilities, even if some people cannot commit all of them. Likewise, some people don't have a sister to commit immoral sexual acts with, but the list still mentions the prohibition on sex with your sister. The Gemara eventually does get to this explanation, but first it detours into a machloket between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva.
Rabbi Ishmael solves the problem by saying first, that the list of 34 is from a male perspective, not a female perspective, and second, that the prohibition on male homosexuality is actually two separate prohibitions, the prohibition on penetrating a man, and the prohibition on being penetrated by a man, derived from different verses.
Meanwhile, Rabbi Akiva holds that both penetrating and being penetrated are covered under the core prohibition of male homosexuality, and thus would only incur one chatat offering if done b'shogeg. So if we ignore the easy answer mentioned above, the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva since Rabbi Akiva would hold there are only 33 mitzvot lo ta'aseh on men that incur karet. The problem is that there's another place in the list that seems to be in accordance with Rabbi Akiva's position, so the Gemara would like to find a way to say the whole list is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva. But they fail, so they just say that one part of the list is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva and another is in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael.
I want to say more about this in general, because whenever I talk about homosexuality in Judaism I want to make sure things are properly scoped to avoid misunderstanding. But I also feel like I don't know enough about historical attitudes about homosexuality to say much here. So feel free to ask questions, but don't expect me to be able to fully answer all questions. And therefore don't take what I'm saying as conclusive about traditional Jewish thinking about homosexuality at all.
I should point out for clarification that although only male homosexuality is discussed here in context of punishment by karet, female homosexual sex is still prohibited, at least d'rabbanan. Why there is this distinction, I can't tell you. Sexism?
But also I think I need to do some more thinking about this, but it's interesting to situate the arayot within the context of keritot. For a lot of reasons, and I think that as I continue learning the Masechet and exploring the question of why certain aveirot incur karet, I may have more to say about this.
Oh, and one more thought. A lot of the situations that have been explored on these past couple pages have been incredibly theoretical. Like, more theoretical than is typical in Gemara. To be obligated in a chatat offering, one must commit b'shogeg a sin that if done b'mezid would incur karet, but a lot of these sins are not the sort that it's easy to imagine being done b'shogeg. And since the Gemara is concerned with the question of whether one incurs multiple chatat offerings for doing multiple related sins in these categories, the hypothetical errors are getting harder and harder to imagine actually happening. There's literally no "Once Rabbi Ploni dealt with this problem, and this is what he did..." taletelling, there's instead a lot of "Imagine the scenario where Ploni managed inexplicably, and we won't say how, to do all these things at once b'shogeg..."
I think there is a reason behind this. I don't think this is a kind of law that gets dealt with very often b'halakha l'maaseh, so there isn't a lot of case law to wrestle with. Judaism extends into every aspect of a Jew's life, but the beis din does not extend into the bedroom with that much reach, for similar reasons to why the American legal system is reluctant to extend into the bedroom.
Aha, we of course get to the problem with a list with a clear enumeration... If there's a number, you can always argue on the number. Cleaner to not have an enumeration. :P
The Mishna said there were 36 aveiros that incurred karet if done intentionally and chatat offering if done b'shogeg. But two of those were mitzot aseh, Pesach and Brit Milah, so there's 34 lo ta'aseh mitzvot. Except not entirely? Because there's no one person who's subject to all 34 mitzot lo ta'aseh.
A lot of the mitzvot that incur karet are arayot, the laws of impermissible sexual relations. Which makes this whole topic incredibly dicey to talk about, but here goes. Two of the arayot, the prohibition on homosexuality and the prohibition on sex with animals, are only imposed on men. And one of the arayot, a different prohibition on sex with animals, is only imposed on women. So men only incur karet from 33 mitzvot lo ta'aseh, and women can only incur karet from 32. But we have an enumerated list of 36 less two, how can this be?
The easiest answer is Well, duh, it's just a list of all the possibilities, even if some people cannot commit all of them. Likewise, some people don't have a sister to commit immoral sexual acts with, but the list still mentions the prohibition on sex with your sister. The Gemara eventually does get to this explanation, but first it detours into a machloket between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva.
Rabbi Ishmael solves the problem by saying first, that the list of 34 is from a male perspective, not a female perspective, and second, that the prohibition on male homosexuality is actually two separate prohibitions, the prohibition on penetrating a man, and the prohibition on being penetrated by a man, derived from different verses.
Meanwhile, Rabbi Akiva holds that both penetrating and being penetrated are covered under the core prohibition of male homosexuality, and thus would only incur one chatat offering if done b'shogeg. So if we ignore the easy answer mentioned above, the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva since Rabbi Akiva would hold there are only 33 mitzvot lo ta'aseh on men that incur karet. The problem is that there's another place in the list that seems to be in accordance with Rabbi Akiva's position, so the Gemara would like to find a way to say the whole list is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva. But they fail, so they just say that one part of the list is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva and another is in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael.
I want to say more about this in general, because whenever I talk about homosexuality in Judaism I want to make sure things are properly scoped to avoid misunderstanding. But I also feel like I don't know enough about historical attitudes about homosexuality to say much here. So feel free to ask questions, but don't expect me to be able to fully answer all questions. And therefore don't take what I'm saying as conclusive about traditional Jewish thinking about homosexuality at all.
I should point out for clarification that although only male homosexuality is discussed here in context of punishment by karet, female homosexual sex is still prohibited, at least d'rabbanan. Why there is this distinction, I can't tell you. Sexism?
But also I think I need to do some more thinking about this, but it's interesting to situate the arayot within the context of keritot. For a lot of reasons, and I think that as I continue learning the Masechet and exploring the question of why certain aveirot incur karet, I may have more to say about this.
Oh, and one more thought. A lot of the situations that have been explored on these past couple pages have been incredibly theoretical. Like, more theoretical than is typical in Gemara. To be obligated in a chatat offering, one must commit b'shogeg a sin that if done b'mezid would incur karet, but a lot of these sins are not the sort that it's easy to imagine being done b'shogeg. And since the Gemara is concerned with the question of whether one incurs multiple chatat offerings for doing multiple related sins in these categories, the hypothetical errors are getting harder and harder to imagine actually happening. There's literally no "Once Rabbi Ploni dealt with this problem, and this is what he did..." taletelling, there's instead a lot of "Imagine the scenario where Ploni managed inexplicably, and we won't say how, to do all these things at once b'shogeg..."
I think there is a reason behind this. I don't think this is a kind of law that gets dealt with very often b'halakha l'maaseh, so there isn't a lot of case law to wrestle with. Judaism extends into every aspect of a Jew's life, but the beis din does not extend into the bedroom with that much reach, for similar reasons to why the American legal system is reluctant to extend into the bedroom.